In low-income communities in both rich and poor countries, redistributive transfers within kin and social networks are frequent. Such arrangements may distort labor supply—acting as a “social tax” that dampens the incentive to work. We document that across countries, from the United States to Côte d’Ivoire, low-income groups report strong pressure to share earned income with others; in addition, social groups that undertake more interpersonal transfers work fewer hours. Using a field experiment, we enable piece-rate factory workers in Côte d’Ivoire to shield income using blocked savings accounts over 9 months. Workers may only deposit earnings increases, relative to baseline, mitigating income effects on labor supply. Offering Private accounts raises work attendance by 6.5% and earnings by 9.4%. These treatment effects are concentrated among workers who report higher redistributive pressure at baseline. To obtain further suggestive evidence on mechanisms, in a supplementary experiment, we vary whether blocked accounts are private or known to the worker’s network. When accounts are private, take-up is substantively higher (60% vs. 14%), with a resultant 8.8% higher earnings. Outgoing transfers do not decline, indicating no loss in redistribution. The welfare benefits of informal redistribution may come at a cost, depressing labor supply and productivity.

Human actions can alter the climate via land use. We analyze the 1930s Great Plains Shelterbelt, a large-scale forestation program across the US Midwest. The program increased precipitation and decreased temperatures for decades. We measure these changes in downwind counties where no trees were planted, isolating the effects of climate from those of afforestation and enabling us to study adaptation. Improved growing conditions allowed farmers to expand corn acreage and adopt water-intensive practices. In a period of farm consolidation, this altered the structure of the agricultural sector, contributing to the survival of small farms but less farm machine usage. The findings demonstrate the endogeneity of climate to land use change and the long-term impacts of tree planting on agricultural development. 

Commuting is notoriously challenging in lower-income country cities, limiting firms’ ability to attract workers from different neighborhoods and reducing the economic benefits of urban agglomeration. This paper examines whether decreasing the non-financial cost of commuting—by commuting with peers rather than alone—reduces this friction and increases labor supply. We conduct two field experiments in urban Côte d’Ivoire. In the first experiment, job seekers are 16pp more likely to accept a formal full-time factory job if their peers also receive a job offer, and 15pp more likely to remain in that job four months later—but only if they will be employed in the same shift (rather than different shifts). These effects are driven by workers with long commute times, who can commute to work together. Consistent with this channel, workers’ own attendance and turnover are predicted by the attendance and quits of co-commuting peers. In a second field experiment with a different firm, we again randomize whether a worker’s peers are offered a job and whether they could commute together. We also randomize job location—inducing exogenous variation in commute time. We replicate the finding of complementarities in labor supply, but only in the case of long assigned commute times. These findings indicate that commuting together serves as an important job amenity with large impacts on labor supply. Our results provide a novel explanation for key features of urban labor markets, including firms’ widespread use of referrals for hiring and persistent gaps in employment across social groups. 

Network data are increasingly available, making experiments on networks possible. Yet, commonly used designs are ill-suited to networks that cannot be split into separate clusters, such as trade between firms. We propose the Split-Graph design, which delivers valid and powerful tests of both direct and spillover effects. We implement the design in a series of field experiments with Paraguay's tax authority, which notifies firms whose VAT returns are inconsistent with third-party reports. Notified firms are 55% more likely to amend their returns and report 900% higher sales, raising both tax liabilities and remittances. Enforcement also spills over to trading partners. A firm reports higher taxes when its weakest suppliers are notified, but not when its strongest suppliers or clients are. These direct and spillover effects have implications for the optimal targeting of tax audits.